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Abstract
For effective social interactions with other people, information about the physical environment must be integrated with
information about the interaction partner. In order to achieve this, processing of social information is guided by two
components: a bottom-up mechanism reflexively triggered by stimulus-related information in the social scene and a top-
down mechanism activated by task-related context information. In the present study, we investigated whether these
components interact during attentional orienting to gaze direction. In particular, we examined whether the spatial
specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by expectations about the reliability of gaze behavior. Expectations were either
induced by instruction or could be derived from experience with displayed gaze behavior. Spatially specific cueing effects
were observed with highly predictive gaze cues, but also when participants merely believed that actually non-predictive
cues were highly predictive. Conversely, cueing effects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were observed with non-predictive
gaze cues, and spatially specific cueing effects were attenuated when actually predictive gaze cues were believed to be
non-predictive. This pattern indicates that (i) information about cue predictivity gained from sampling gaze behavior across
social episodes can be incorporated in the attentional orienting to social cues, and that (ii) beliefs about gaze behavior
modulate attentional orienting to gaze direction even when they contradict information available from social episodes.
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Introduction
In order to engage in interactions with other people we need to
know who we are interacting with, and what others are going to do
next [1]. Based on this knowledge, which can be acquired directly
by interacting with people or indirectly by either observing someone
interacting with another person or by receiving information about
a person, we make inferences about the other’s internal states,
including intentions, beliefs, and feelings. The core of this
mentalizing process [2] is that our predictions about others are
based not simply on information about the state of the world, but
also on our assumptions about the others’ internal states.
Accordingly, the interpretation of social scenes is thought to
involve two components that interact with each other: (i) a bottom-
up mechanism that is activated by perceptual information in the
social scene, and (ii) a top-down mechanism that is based on
background knowledge we have about others, or inferences we
draw from perceived information. The combination of bottom-up
and top-down processing ensures that our brain is able to react
flexibly to the current situation while at the same time computes
the most likely interpretation of the given perceptual input (based
on context information about the interaction partner and the
scene).
For understanding others in everyday situations, the human
brain is equipped with a system that is specialized for processing
social information, which consists of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
superior temporal sulcus (STS), orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala and anterior
insula [3,4]. Bottom-up responses to social signals are thought to be
generated in the STS, which is particularly sensitive to biological
movements (head/body movements, gestures, gaze direction/
shifts) (for a review: [2]). Top-down modulation of these responses
is assumed to originate from the mPFC (involved in mentalizing
and processing of intentional behavior) and the amygdala
(involved in the processing of the emotional content of the scene)
[5,6,7], which help weight bottom-up signals according to their
social relevance.
One of the most fundamental mechanisms employed in the
processing of social information is following the gaze of others.
Gaze direction is very informative, as it indicates their focus of
interest and encourages the observer to shift attention to the same
location (for a review: [8]). Gaze-triggered shifts of attention have
been investigated using cueing paradigms [8,9], in which a face is
presented centrally that gazes either straight ahead, to the left, or
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to the right. Reactions to targets appearing in the gazed-at
hemifield are typically faster than those to targets in the opposite
hemifield [9,10,11].
Gaze direction has traditionally been thought to be special in
guiding attention. In contrast to other central cues [12–14], gaze
direction triggers shifts of attention to peripheral locations when it
is not predictive [9,10,15] or even counter-predictive with respect
to the target location [16] – a pattern that is consistent with a
reflexive mechanism.
However, the view that gaze cues provide particularly powerful
attentional orienting signals (reflecting their social relevance) has
recently been challenged by evidence showing that not only gaze,
but also other overlearned symbolic (e.g., arrow) cues are capable
of inducing shifts of attention when they are not predictive [17–
20,16]. Furthermore, orienting attention in response to gaze
direction can be top-down controlled if appropriate context
information is available [10,11,21]. In particular, pre-existing
assumptions concerning the observed stimulus have been shown to
influence gaze cueing [22–26]: when humans believe that the
observed gaze behavior is intentional, gaze cueing effects are
larger compared to when the gazer is believed to display only
mechanistic behavior [25,27]. Similarly, when the gazer represents
the leader of a group that the observer belongs to (e.g., a political
party), the observer is more likely to follow his/her gaze direction
[28].
Taken together, these findings suggest that gaze direction can
evoke a top-down mechanism (in addition to a bottom-up
mechanism that is always triggered), depending on whether or
not task-relevant information is available. In support of this dual-
component model, Wiese and colleagues [11] have shown that
when targets were presented in an unstructured visual field, cueing
was not specific to the exact gazed-at position, but facilitated all
positions within the cued hemifield to an equal degree. However,
when additional context information was provided in form of
peripheral placeholders, cueing effects were the strongest for the
exact gazed-at location. The authors took this pattern to indicate
that bottom-up and top-down mechanisms are co-active in gaze
following: while the bottom-up (reflexive) component causes a
general directional bias for the whole cued hemifield, the top-
down component triggers facilitation specific to the particular
gazed-at position.
Experiments
The present study was designed to investigate whether gaze-
induced attentional orienting can be top-down modulated by the
participants’ expectations about the observed gaze behavior.
Expectations were induced by either actual predictivity of gaze
behavior (i.e., likelihood with which targets appeared at gazed-at
locations) or instructed predictivity (independent of the actual
predictivity). In Experiment 1, actual (i.e., experienced) predictiv-
ity tallied with instructed (i.e., believed) predictivity, so as to assess
the combined influence of believed and experienced predictivity
on the spatial specificity of gaze cueing. Experiment 2 examined
whether an effect of cue predictivity on the spatial specificity of
gaze cueing would also be observed when participants are not
explicitly informed about the likelihood with which gaze cues
indicate the target position (i.e., when instructions do not provide
information about cue predictivity). Experiment 3 examined the
spatial specificity of gaze cueing in conditions in which believed
and experienced predictivity are in conflict (i.e., when high actual
predictivity is believed to be low and low actual predictivity is
believed to be high).
Based on the two-component model of Wiese et al. [11], we
expected that when believed and actual predictivity are congruent,
non-predictive displayed gaze behavior would activate the bottom-
up component only, resulting in equal cueing effects for the whole
hemifield. Predictive gaze behavior, by contrast, would addition-
ally invoke the top-down component, giving rise to facilitation that
is specific to the exact gazed-at position. Hence, in Experiment 1
(believed and actual predictivity congruent) we expected spatially
specific cueing effects for highly predictive cues and non-specific
cueing effects for non-predictive cues. If predictivity can be
inferred from observing the gazer’s behavior, then a similar
pattern of effects should be observed in Experiment 2, where no
explicit information about predictivity was given to participants.
However, if observation-based inferences about cue predictivity
are prone to influences from knowledge acquired through explicit
instruction, the spatial specificity related to actual predictivity
should be modulated by believed predictivity in Experiment 3.
That is, nonspecific cueing effects triggered by non-predictive cues
should become spatially more specific when the cue is believed to
be predictive (Experiment 3), relative to when it is believed to be
non-predictive (Experiment 1). By the same token, specific gaze-
cueing effects induced by predictive cues should be less specific
when the cue is believed to be non-predictive (Experiment 3)
compared to when it is believed to be predictive (Experiment 1).
Methods and Materials
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, gaze cues either predicted the target location
with a high likelihood (80%), or they were non-predictive (< 17%).
Participants were explicitly informed about these probabilities.
There were three semi-circularly arranged target positions in each
hemifield, which were not marked by placeholders (See Figure 1A,
and [11] for effects of non-predictive gaze cues without versus with
placeholders). Participants had to make a speeded localization (left
vs. right hemifield) response to the target. We expected predictive
gaze cues to produce the strongest cueing effect for the exact
gazed-at position, whereas non-predictive cues would generate
equal cueing effects for all target positions within the cued
hemifield.
Participants. Twelve volunteers (8 women; mean age: 25
years, range: 20–30 years; all right-handed, with normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity) participated in the experiment
either for course credit or payment (8J/h) and gave their written
informed consent. The experimental procedure was approved by
the ethics committee of the Department of Psychology, University
of Munich, in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Testing time was
two hours, split into two sessions.
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented on a 17’’ Graphics Series
G90fB CRT monitor with the refresh rate of 85 Hz. Reaction
time (RT) measures were based on standard keyboard responses.
Experiments were controlled by the software Experiment Builder (SR
Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). Participants were seated 57 cm
away from the monitor, centered with respect to display and
keyboard.
Stimuli. Schematic faces, constructed in line with Friesen and
Kingstone [9], were presented in the center of the display as black
drawings against a white background. The round face outline
circumscribed an area of 6.8u of visual angle and contained two
circles representing the eyes, a smaller circle symbolizing the nose,
and a straight line representing the mouth. The eyes subtended
1.0u and were positioned on the horizontal midline, at a distance
of 61.0u from the vertical midline. The nose subtended 0.2u, was
Instruction-Based Beliefs Affect Gaze Cueing
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located 0.9u below the eyes, and served as fixation point. The
mouth was 2.2u in length and centered 1.3u below the nose. Black
filled circles, subtending 0.5u, appeared within the eyes, repre-
senting the pupils. Gaze cues were implemented by moving the
pupils sideways into one of six different directions: pupils were
either shifted left- or rightwards on the central horizontal axis or
rotated up- or downwards relative to the midline by an angle of
60u, until they touched the outline eye circles. The target stimulus
was a gray dot 0.5u in diameter. Targets could appear at one of six
positions equally distributed on an imaginary circle with a radius
of 6.0u around the fixation point within the central face
(Figure 1A). The angular distance between adjacent targets was
60u.
Design. Each session of the experiment consisted of 740
trials, with a block of 20 practice trials preceding 20 experimental
blocks of 36 trials each. Gaze direction (left, right), gaze position
(top, center, bottom), target side (left, right), and target position
(top, center, bottom) were presented pseudo-randomly. Cue
predictivity was blocked: one testing session was devoted to non-
predictive and the other to predictive cues, with session order
counterbalanced across participants. In the non-predictive condi-
tion, targets appeared at each of the six target positions with the
same likelihood (<17%); by contrast, in the predictive condition,
targets appeared with a likelihood of 80% at the exact gazed-at
position and a likelihood of 4% each at one of the other five
positions.
Procedure. Figure 1B illustrates the sequence of events on a
trial. Trials started with the onset of a central fixation cross.
400 ms later, a face with blank eyes was presented. After a random
interval of 700–1000 ms, pupils appeared within the eyes looking
at one of the six target positions (Figure 1A). Following the cue, a
target dot appeared at one of the six target positions at a stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA) of 500 ms. Schematic face, pupils, and
target remained on the screen until a response was given or
1200 ms had elapsed. Participants were asked to determine, as fast
and accurately as possible, whether targets were presented on the
left or right side of the screen, pressing the ‘‘D’’- or ‘‘K’’-key with
their left or right index finger for a target on the left or right side,
respectively. The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was 680 ms.
Participants were veridically informed about the predictivity of
the gaze cues: Instruction 1 stated that gaze direction was not
predictive of the location of the upcoming target, and Instruction 2
informed them that the target would appear with a high likelihood
at the gazed-at position.
Analysis. To examine whether the basic cueing effects were
significant, the mean (correct) RTs were subjected to an ANOVA
with the factors validity (valid, invalid), gaze position (top, center,
bottom), target position (top, center, bottom), and predictivity (low,
high).
The specificity of gaze cueing was assessed in a repeated-
measures ANOVA on the gaze-cueing effects, with the factors gaze
position (top, center, bottom), target position (top, center, bottom), and
predictivity (low, high). Cueing effects were calculated as the RT-
difference between a validly cued position (i.e., gaze direction and
target side matched) and the respective invalidly cued position (i.e.,
gaze direction and target side did not match) on the same
horizontal axis. For instance, cueing effects for the top-position
(60u in the upper quadrant) on the left side were calculated as the
RT-difference between trials on which this position was validly
cued (i.e., gaze directed to the left) compared to when this position
was invalidly cued (i.e., gaze directed to the right). For the
ANOVA, cueing effects were collapsed across the two hemifields.
Specific cueing effects would manifest as a significant interaction
between gaze position and target position, with stronger cueing
effects for the gazed-at position than for the other positions in the
same hemifield. By contrast, non-specific gaze cueing would yield
equal facilitation for all positions in the cued hemifield (i.e., a main
effect of validity, in the absence of a gaze position x target position
interaction on the cueing effects). If predictivity influenced the
specificity of gaze cueing, the interaction among predictivity, gaze
position, and target position should be significant, with the
interaction between gaze and target position being significant only
for predictive cues.
Results. Anticipations (defined as responses with latency
,100 ms, 1.29%), misses (defined as responses with latency .
1200 ms, 3.69%), and incorrect responses (1.49%) were excluded
from analysis. Please see Table S1 in Supplementary Materials for
mean RTs and associated standard errors, and Table S2 for the
results of the ANOVA on RTs. Results of follow-up ANOVAs on
RTs, with the factors validity (valid, invalid), gaze position (top,
center, bottom), target position (top, center, bottom), conducted
separately for each predictivity condition are reported in Table S3.
Figure 2 presents the cueing effects for predictive and non-
predictive trials as a function of gaze position and target position.
Results of the ANOVA on gaze-cueing effects are reported below.
The ANOVA of the RTs revealed a significant gaze cueing
effect with shorter RTs for the valid compared to the invalid trials
[validity: F(1,11) = 109.437, p,.001, gP
2 = .909]. The ANOVA of
the cueing effects revealed the gaze-cueing effects to be overall
larger with predictive (DRT= 61 ms) than with non-predictive
cues (DRT= 11 ms) [predictivity: F(1,11) = 44.716, p,.001,
gP
2 = .803]. Moreover, the spatial distribution of the gaze-cueing
Figure 1. Stimulus and target positions (A) and sequence of
events within a trial (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094529.g001
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effects was dependent on the relation of the gazed position to the
actual target position in the cued hemifield [gaze position x target
position: F(4,44) = 18.716, p,.001, gP
2 = .630]. Importantly,
however, the spatial distribution of cueing effects differed
significantly between predictive and non-predictive cues [pre-
dictivity x gaze position x target position: F(4,44) = 15.265,
p,.001, gP
2 = .581], with more specific cueing effects for the
predictive compared to the non-predictive condition. All other
effects were non-significant (all Fs,2.543, all ps..101, all
gP
2,.188).
To statistically test whether the spatially specific component
manifested only with predictive, but not with non-predictive, cues,
the cueing effects were examined in follow-up ANOVAs with only
the factors gaze position (top, center, bottom) and target position (top,
center, bottom), conducted separately for each of the predictivity
conditions. With non-predictive cues, the cueing effects were of
comparable size for all target positions in the cued hemifield [gaze
position x target position: F(4,44) = 1.078, p= .379, gP
2 = .088];
see Table S3 for the main effect of validity. By contrast, with
predictive cues, the size of gaze-cueing effect depended on the
congruency of the gazed-at and the target position [gaze position x
target position: F(4,44) = 18.309, p,.001, gP
2 = .625], with larger
cueing effects for the gazed-at position compared to the other
positions in the cued hemifield. All other effects were non-
significant (all Fs,1.973, all ps..163, all gP
2..152).
To examine more directly whether cue predictivity had an
influence on the spatial specificity of gaze cueing, we compared the
size of cueing effects for the exact gazed-at position with the other
two locations (averaged together) in the cued hemifield in a two-
way ANOVA with the within-participants factors location (exact,
other) and predictivity (high, low). Spatial specificity of gaze cueing
was found to be strongly influenced by predictivity [F(1,11) =
31.461, p,.001, gP
2 = .741] with significantly larger gaze-cueing
effects for the exact gazed-at position than for the other two
locations in the predictive condition (DGCexact-other = 61 ms,
t(11) = 6.111, p,.001, d=1.89, two-tailed), but not in the non-
predictive condition (DGCexact-other = 3 ms, t(11) = 1.513, p= .159,
d= .38, two-tailed). All T-tests were Bonferroni-corrected for
multiple comparisons.
Discussion. Experiment 1 investigated whether attentional
orienting to gaze direction is influenced by explicit (i.e., instructed)
and implicit (i.e., experienced) information about the predictivity
of gaze behavior. The results showed that for predictive cues, gaze
cueing was significantly stronger for targets that appeared at the
exact gazed-at position relative to targets that appeared at one of
the other two positions in the cued hemifield. Non-predictive cues, by
contrast, generated significant gaze-cueing effects (see Table S3)
that were equally strong for all target positions within the cued
hemifield.
The finding that predictivity influences both the size and spatial
distribution of gaze-cueing effects raises an interesting question,
namely: is the observed pattern mediated by instruction-induced
expectations, or does it emerge as a result of acquired experience
with gaze cues of various degrees of predictivity? The results of
Experiment 1 alone cannot answer this question, as experienced
( = actual) and believed ( = instructed) predictivity were always
congruent. The following two experiments were designed to
disentangle the effects of experience versus belief. Experiment 2
investigated whether the pattern of results in Experiment 1 can be
replicated when no explicit information is given about the cue
predictivity (i.e., when no beliefs are induced), but when
information about gaze–target contingencies can only be inferred
from experience with the observed gaze behavior. In Experiment
3, we examined whether the spatial specificity that is induced by
knowledge gained from experience with the actual cue predictivity
(i.e., experienced predictivity) is modulated by knowledge acquired
through instructions (i.e., believed predictivity) in conditions when
these two sources of information are contrasted. To this end,
believed and experienced predictivity were manipulated orthog-
onally in Experiment 3: in the high predictivity condition,
participants were told that gaze cues are non-predictive; in the
low predictivity condition, by contrast, participants were told that
gaze cues are highly predictive.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of experienced
predictivity alone, that is: participants did not receive a-priori
information about cue predictivity by instruction, but could
deduce this information only from experience with displayed gaze
behavior. If participants are able to deduce/learn predictivity
through experience with the observed gaze behavior predictive
gaze cues should produce the strongest cueing effect for the exact
Figure 2. Gaze-cueing effects as function of gaze position and target position for (A) high actual and instructed predictivity; for (B)
low actual and instructed predictivity. Depicted error bars represent standard errors of the mean adjusted to within-participants design.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094529.g002
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gazed-at position, whereas non-predictive cues should generate
equal effects for all target positions within the cued hemifield,
similar to Experiment 1.
Methodological details of Experiment 2 were the same as those
of Experiment 1, with one exception: in Experiment 2, partic-
ipants were not explicitly informed about cue predictivity in the
instruction (i.e., no beliefs induced), so that they could infer this
information only from their experience with the observed gaze
behavior.
Participants. Twelve new volunteers (11 women; mean age:
25 years, range: 19–30 years; two left-handed, all with normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity; all having given written
informed consent) participated in Experiment 2, either for course
credit or payment (8J/h).
Results and Discussion. Anticipations (1.79%), misses
(0.08%), and incorrect responses (2.04%) were excluded from
analysis. Table S4 in Supplementary Materials reports mean RTs
and associated standard errors, and Table S5 shows the ANOVA
results on RTs. ANOVA-results on gaze-cueing effects are
summarized in Table S6, and effects of interest are reported
below.
The ANOVA of the RTs revealed a significant gaze cueing
effect with shorter RTs for the valid compared to the invalid
conditions [validity: F(1,11) = 14.283, p= .003, gP
2 = .192]. The
ANOVA of the cueing effects revealed actual cue predictivity to
influence the allocation of spatial attention induced by gaze cues:
highly predictive cues gave rise to larger cueing effects (DRT=
40 ms) than non-predictive cues (DRT= 12 ms) [predictivity:
F(1,11) = 10.765, p= .007, gP
2 = .495]. Importantly, predictivity
had a significant influence on the spatial specificity of gaze cueing,
with general cueing effects for non-predictive cues and spatially
specific cueing effects for the highly predictive cues [predictivity x
gaze position x target position: F(4,44) = 5.018, p= .002,
gP
2 = .313].
To statistically test whether the spatially specific component
manifested only with predictive, but not with non-predictive, cues,
the cueing effects were examined in two follow-up ANOVAs (one
for each predictivity condition) with the factors gaze position (top,
center, bottom) and target position (top, center, bottom). With non-
predictive cues, gaze cueing effects were of comparable size for all
target positions in the cued hemifield [gaze position x target
position: F(4,44) = .727, p= .578, gP
2 = .062]. For predictive cues,
by contrast, cueing effects were significantly larger at the gazed-at
position compared to the other positions in the cued hemifield
[gaze position x target position: F(4,44) = 5.229, p= .002,
gP
2 = .322].
The spatial specificity of gaze cueing was found to be strongly
influenced by predictivity [F(1,11) = 15.989, p= .002, gP
2 = .592],
with significantly larger cueing effects for the exact gazed-at
position than for the other two locations in the predictive condition
(DGCexact-other = 30 ms, t(11) = 3.982, p= .002, d= 1.05, two-
tailed), but not in the non-predictive condition (DGCexact-other =
3 ms, t(11) = 1.513, p= .159, d= .23, two-tailed). T-tests were
Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, the effects of actual and believed predictivity
were contrasted. Participants received either Instruction 1: they were
told that the cues were highly predictive, when they actually were
non-predictive (actual predictivity: 17%; instructed predictivity: 80%); or
Instruction 2: they were told that gaze cues were non-predictive,
when they actually were highly predictive (actual predictivity: 80%,
instructed predictivity: 17%). The order of instructions was counter-
balanced across participants. To examine the influence of
experienced versus believed predictivity on gaze cueing effects,
we compared conditions with the same actual but different
instructed predictivities. For that purpose, we conducted a four-
way ANOVA of the gaze-cueing effects with the within-participant
factors gaze position (top, center, bottom), target position (top, center,
bottom), and actual predictivity (high, low), and the between-
participant factor experiment (Experiment 1: experience congruent
with instruction, Experiment 3: experience incongruent with
instruction). In addition, we examined whether potential effects of
believed predictivity on experienced predictivity changed over the
course of the experiment, with a stronger influence of believed
predictivity in the first half of the experiment and a stronger
influence of experienced predictivity in the second half of the
experiment. To this end, we conducted a four-way ANOVA of the
gaze-cueing effects with the within-participant factors gaze position
(top, center, bottom), target position (top, center, bottom), predictivity
(high, low) and half (first, second).
Methods in Experiment 3 were similar to Experiment 1, with
one exception: In Experiment 3, actual and instructed predictivity
were incongruent, in contrast to Experiment 1 in which they were
congruent.
Participants. Twelve new volunteers (10 women; mean age:
25 years, range: 20–28 years; all right-handed, all with normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity; all having given written
informed consent) participated in Experiment 3, either for course
credit or payment (8J/h).
Results and Discussion. Anticipations (0.82%), misses
(0.09%), and incorrect responses (3.86%) were excluded from
analysis. Table S7 in Supplementary Materials reports mean RTs
and associated standard errors, and Table S8 summarizes the
ANOVA results on RTs. ANOVA-results on gaze-cueing effects
are summarized in Table S9, and effects of interest are reported
below.
The ANOVA of the RTs revealed a significant gaze cueing
effect with shorter RTs for the valid compared to the invalid
conditions [validity: F(1,11) = 59.829, p,.001, gP
2 = .845]. The
ANOVA of the cueing effects revealed actual cue predictivity to
influence the allocation of spatial attention induced by gaze cues
(see Figure 3): gaze cues with high actual predictivity gave rise to
larger cueing effects than non-predictive cues [actual predictivity:
F(1,22) = 64.975, p,.001, gP
2 = .803]. Moreover, highly predic-
tive cues generated cueing effects specific to the gazed-at position
[actual predictivity x gaze position x target position: F(4,88) =
15.130, p,.001, gP
2 = .407], with significant differences between
the exact cued versus the other positions: all ts. 2.295, ps,.031, d
.1.18, two-tailed). Crucially, this pattern was modulated by
believed predictivity [experiment x actual predictivity x gaze
position x target position: F(4,88) = 5.419, p= .001, gP
2 = .198],
that is: the allocation of spatial attention in response to the
experienced (i.e., actual) cue predictivity was top-down modulated
by expectations based on the believed (i.e., instructed) cue
predictivity – see Figure 4.
In subsequent analyses, the spatial specificity of gaze cueing and
its modulation by instructed predictivity was examined for high
versus low predictivity conditions separately. Non-predictive cues
generated nonspecific cueing effects when participants believed
that the cue was not predictive (Exp.1), whereas the same cues
produced specific effects when participants believed that the gaze
cues were predictive (Exp.3) [experiment x gaze position x target
position: F(4,88) = 5.649, p,.001, gP
2 = .204]. Planned compar-
isons revealed significantly larger gaze-cueing effects for the exact
gazed-at position than for the other positions within the cued
hemifield when participants were told that the cues were predictive
(Exp.3, DGCcued-other = 17 ms), compared to when they were
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informed that the cues were non-predictive (Exp.1, DGCcued-other =
3 ms); [t(21) = 3.478, p= .002, d=1.42, two-tailed], see Figure 4A.
Similarly, believed predictivity modulated the spatial specificity of
gaze cueing for predictive cues [experiment x gaze position x target
position: F(4,88) = 2.583, p= .043, gP
2 = .105]: the spatially
specific component was significantly stronger for cues believed to
be predictive (Exp.1, DGCcued-other = 61 ms) compared to cues
believed to be non-predictive (Exp.3, DGCcued-other = 32 ms),
[t(21) = 22.216, p= .037, d=0.90, two-tailed], see Figure 4B.
Complete results are reported in Table S10. All T-tests were
Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons.
Finally, we examined whether the interactive effect of believed
and experienced predictivity on the specificity of gaze cueing
changed over the course of the experiment, with a stronger effect
of believed predictivity in the first half and a stronger influence of
experienced predictivity in the second half of the experiment. We
found no effect of half (first, second) on the spatial distribution of
the gaze cueing effects [half x predictivity x gaze position x target
position: F(4,44) = 1.761, p= .154, gP
2 = .138], indicating that the
top-down modulation of believed predictivity on experienced
predictivity was stable throughout the experiment.
General Discussion
The goal of the present study was to investigate whether
fundamental mechanisms of social cognition such as orienting of
attention in response to gaze direction are influenced by context
information about the predictivity of observed gaze behavior. In
three experiments, information about predictivity could be
implicitly inferred from observed gaze behavior (i.e., experienced
predictivity). In Experiment 1 and 3 (but not in Experiment 2),
information about predictivity was also provided explicitly by
instruction (i.e., believed predictivity): in these experiments,
experienced predictivity either was (Experiment 1) or was not
congruent (Experiment 3) with believed predictivity.
When actual and instructed predictivity matched (Experiment
1), we expected specific cueing effects for the exact gazed-at
location in the predictive condition and cueing effects for the
whole cued hemifield in the non-predictive condition. When no
information about cue predictivity was given by instruction
(Experiment 2), we expected specific cueing effects for high
predictivity and nonspecific cueing effects for low predictivity, if
participants were able to acquire information about gaze–target
contingencies based on experience (similar to Experiment 1).
Experiment 3 was designed to examine whether knowledge about
cue predictivity gained through experience (i.e., experienced
predictivity) interacts with knowledge acquired through instruction
(i.e., believed predictivity). To this end, actual and instructed
predictivity were made to mismatch in Experiment 3. On the
assumption that knowledge about predictivity acquired through
instruction interacts with knowledge about predictivity gained
from experience, we expected that gaze cueing effects induced by
highly predictive cues should be spatially less specific when they
were believed to be non-predictive. By the same logic, cueing
effects induced by non-predictive cues should become spatially
more specific when they were believed to be highly predictive as to
the target position.
Spatially specific cueing effects for highly predictive cues and
non-specific cueing effects for non-predictive cues were predicted
based on Wiese and colleagues [11], who showed that a general
gaze-cueing effect for the whole gazed-at hemifield could be
complemented by a cueing effect specific for the gazed-at position,
when context information was provided in the scene (i.e., when
peripheral position placeholders were presented that could be
referred to by gaze). This pattern led the authors to propose a two-
component model of gaze cueing, according to which specific
gaze-cueing effects are mediated by a context-dependent top-down
component that is integrated with a bottom-up component
producing a general directional bias towards the gaze-cued
hemifield.
The present findings provide further support for the two-
component model. In the present study, gaze cueing was not
modulated by visual context information (i.e., placeholders) but by
believed and / or experienced context information about the
reliability of gaze behavior: with predictive cues, gaze-cueing
effects were significantly larger for targets that appeared at the
exact gazed-at position relative to targets at the other two positions
within the cued hemifield; non-predictive cues, by contrast, gave rise
to cueing effects of equivalent magnitude for all positions within the
cued hemifield. Importantly, the effects of experienced predictivity
were modulated by expected predictivity: non-predictive cues
Figure 3. Gaze-cueing effects as function of gaze position and target position for (A) high actual predictivity and low instructed
predictivity; for (B) low actual predictivity and high instructed predictivity. Depicted error bars represent corrected standard errors of the
mean adjusted to within-participants design.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094529.g003
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believed to be predictive caused cueing effects specific to the gazed-
at position, compared to non-predictive cues that were veridically
instructed to be non-predictive (Figure 4A). In contrast, specific
cueing effects caused by actually predictive cues were significantly
reduced when the cue was believed to be non-predictive (Figure 4B).
The present results extend previous findings of Wiese and
colleagues [11] by showing that gaze cueing effects may not only
be up-, but also down-regulated depending on the context
information that is provided about cue predictivity: a specific
cueing effect caused by actually predictive cues is reduced in its
spatial specificity when participants believe that the cue is non-
predictive; by the same token, spatially non-specific cueing effects
induced by actually non-predictive cues yield increased spatial
specificity when participants are told that the cue is predictive
(Figures 2, 3, and 4). Thus, together with previous findings, this
study supports the view that top-down modulation of the spatial
distribution of cueing effects can be induced by various types of
context information: visual information provided in the scene (i.e.,
position placeholder), empirical knowledge (i.e., gained through
experience), and verbal information (i.e., instruction about the
reliability of gaze behavior).
Nevertheless, although the present results provide evidence for a
modulation of gaze cueing effects by context information, it is less
clear whether orienting to gaze in conditions without context
information reflects a pure bottom-up mechanism. In this regard,
one potential limitation of the present study is owing to the fact
that an intermediate cue–target SOA (of 500 ms) was used in all
experiments, while pure bottom-up effects are more likely
observed at short SOAs. However, based on findings from
classical gaze-cueing experiments [8,9], there is no reason to
assume that bottom-up effects cannot be found at longer SOAs.
In fact, Friesen and Kingstone [9] have shown that when
non-predictive gaze cues are used and no context information is
given that would allow for top-down modulation, gaze-cueing
effects are found for a broad range of SOAs (100, 300, 600, and
1000 ms). An even more striking demonstration of bottom-up
orienting to gaze direction at long SOAs can be found in Friesen,
Ristic, and Kingstone [29], who observed reflexive orienting to
counter-predictive gaze cues at SOAs of 600 ms (compared to
SOAs of 1200 or 1800 ms, at which participants voluntarily
shifted attention to predicted locations). That is, SOA alone does
not determine whether bottom-up and / or top-down processes
are involved in attentional orienting to gaze direction; instead, the
decisive factor is the availability of context information (e.g., about
cue predictivity) that permits the observer to interpret gaze
behavior in a socially meaningful way. Our study supports this
interpretation by showing that although significant cueing effects
were found in all conditions (even when actual and believed
predictivity were low and no context information was provided) for
an SOA of 500 ms, the size and spatial specificity of these cueing
effects were modulated only if context information about the
reliability of the cue was available.
The observation that explicit knowledge about who we are
interacting with does influence basic attentional processes involved
in social interactions is consistent with [1,24,25,27], where it has
been suggested that bottom-up orienting to gaze cues can be top-
down controlled by contextual information about the gazer.
Similarly, familiarity with the gazer (stimuli depicting participants’
colleagues; gender effect for women: [22]) or belonging to the same
group as the gazer (e.g., political party: [28]) has also been shown to
modulate the size of gaze-cueing effects. Note, however, that these
studies have demonstrated a modulation of gaze cueing only under
very specific conditions, namely: when context information is pre-
existing and not acquired during the experiment.
Figure 4. Comparison between Experiments. Gaze-cueing effects as function of target position (exact gazed-at position vs. other positions in
cued hemifield), instructed predictivity (high: solid line, low: dashed line) and actual predictivity (high: left side, low: right side). Note that the bigger
the difference (the steeper the depicted line) between gaze-cueing effects for the exact and the other positions in the cued hemifield, the more
specific the allocation of attention to the gazed-at position. Depicted error bars represent corrected standard errors adjusted to within-subject
designs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094529.g004
Instruction-Based Beliefs Affect Gaze Cueing
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 April 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e94529
In contrast to previous studies, the present study shows that gaze
cueing effects can also be modulated, when context information
has to be acquired through experience. In particular, we showed
that knowledge about gaze–target contingencies can be learned
over the course of the experiment, which then modulates the size
and the spatial specificity of the gaze-cueing effects: when the
gazing face indicates target position with a high reliability, cueing
effects are larger and spatially more specific than when gaze cues
are not predictive of target location. This finding appears to be at
variance with a previous study by Bayliss and Tipper [26], who
found effects of predictivity on subjective judgments about the
gazers’ trustworthiness, but no modulation of gaze cueing effects
when knowledge about the reliability of the gazer had to be
inferred from experience. However, there is a substantial
difference between Bayliss and Tipper’s study [26] and the present
experiments: in [26], information about the reliability of the gazer
was coupled with facial identity (i.e., multiple different faces
indicated target position with different likelihoods) and random-
ized throughout the experiment, whereas in the present study the
same face was used throughout the whole experiment and
information about predictivity was blocked. One problem arising
from coupling gaze direction and facial identity in one experiment
is that the interpretation of these two signals is subserved by
different neural networks and that their outputs are integrated only
at later stages of information processing [30]. Given that gaze
cueing produces fast-acting effects on attentional orienting, it is
likely that cueing studies fail to disclose effects of slower-acting
facial identity information on the response to gaze cues.
In summary, our findings show that early operations of spatial
attention are highly penetrable by cognitive processes related to
social context. The involvement of a context-modulated mecha-
nism in gaze cueing is very plausible, as gaze-triggered mecha-
nisms of attention are specifically sensitive to the social relevance
of the environment within which they operate: the bottom-up
component assures a general preparedness to social signals
conveyed by other people, while the top-down mechanism allows
flexible adaptation to the social context of a scene. The present
study shows that in integrating context information within social
attention mechanisms, humans tend to incorporate what they are
told about others into their own experience and observation.
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